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ABSTRACT: This paper examines the management of irrigation in the Gezira Scheme, 
Sudan. It focuses on the tenants' management of water at the farm level. The authors argue 
that despite several decades of top-down instructions, Gezira Scheme tenants till retain their 
indigenous agricultural calendar. The calendar contains description ofweather, ain, pests and 
possible yields and accordingly prescribes specific agricultural ctivities. This gives rise to 
informal channels of action which often contradict official instructions. Unlike the 
management of the Gezira Scheme, the authors do not take the informal channels as 
indicative of the tenants' lack of discipline, laziness or ignorance. Rather, they constitute 
innovative and practical response to Scheme inefficiency and bureaucratic rigidity. Most 
importantly, the adoption of these informal channels renders agricultural operations both 
practical and economically viable. 
Prelude 
On one of  the typical days of  December 1987 in a typical 
tenants village in the Gezira, a group of farmers were 
listening to a programme broadcasted by Radio Medani,  
Central Region. The Broadcaster went on as follows: 
"Farmers are advised tostart cotton picking from the section 
of the tenancy adjacent to Abu XX canal (angaya) nd then 
move away from the canal to the end of the tenancy." 
A loud laughter of  amusement came from the farmers 
surrounding the transistor radio. One of them shouted in a 
cynical way: 
"This is yet another Gezira Scheme official reading from his 
books; that systematic cultivation was abandoned ages ago. 
For lack of water, the practice of watering, sowing and picking 
of cotton from the canal away to the end of the tenancy has 
been reversed by the farmers for years and years and those 
people still stick to their old and invalid books?' 
Introduction 
This article deals with the farmers' management of  
irrigation in the Gezira Scheme. The article is based on a 
research conducted with the aim of identifying methods of 
conserving water as a part of  the Scheme rehabil itation 
plans in the late 1980s. The Scheme was established in the 
1920s in the area between the Blue and the While Nile 
south of  their confluence at Khartoum. Since its establish- 
ment, the Scheme continued to be the backbone of  Sudan 
economy accounting for around 60% of export revenue. It 
has also continued to be dominated by cotton cultivation 
although some food crops are also grown in the Scheme. 
Once described as "Africa's most successful agricultural 
venture ever", the Gezira Scheme has long passed its 
golden age. After sixty years of  instructions from the 
agricultural inspectors, the tenants of  the Gezira Scheme 
are still retaining their separate agricultural calendar. This 
calendar is virtually unknown to the majority of  the 
bureaucrats of  the Scheme and is therefore unaccounted 
for in the top down decision making process. Indeed, it was 
assumed that the pre-Scheme peasant agricultural system 
which was based on rainfed cultivation (June to 
November)  was irrelevant o the new and albeit modern 
system of irrigated agriculture. It was therefore expected 
that continuous upervision, training and extension would 
lead to the replacement of the old and archaic agricultural 
system by a modern one based on scientific experiment. 
This is partially responsible for ignoring the farmers' 
knowledge in the irrigation planning in the Gezira Scheme. 
Needless to say, the divergence between the official 
agricultural system and its peasant counterpart is liable to 
lead to lack of strict adherence to the agricultural 
instructions in the Scheme. Understanding of  the farmers' 
agricultural calendar is therefore necessary in order to 
accommodate the differences between the two systems. 
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Farmers' Agricultural Calendar 
The present agricultural calendar narrated by the 
studied farmers evolves from two distinct systems. The first 
one is referred to as E1-Kabbashi. The term itself is derived 
from the name of its famous propagator who died about a 
century ago. The second system referred to as Sabbag, a 
term whose origin is not known to us. The calendar 
divides the year, or at least the active part of it, into a 
number of equal durations (Eenat, sing. Eena). Each Eena 
is 13 to 13.5 days long. An Eena is characterised byspecific 
weather which influences agricultural activities. The 
calender also includes instructions to farmers on various 
activities: 

























Saratan (Cancer), is also referred to as 
Natra. 
22rid April to 5th May 
Intense heat (unhealthy) and dusty 
winds (haboob). 
Butain 
5th May to 18th May 
Deterioration of pasture; rain 
damaging to pasture and health; rain 
unsuitable for cultivation; sharp 
increase in prices of sorghum. 
Thuraya 
18th May to 31st May 
Intense heat; animals miscarry; 
chicken eggs go rotten. 
Dubran 
31st May to 13th June 
Heavy winds. 
El-Hagaa 
13th June to 26th June 
Winds continue; cloudy; occasional 
deceptive showers. 
Hanaa 
26th June to 9th July 
Autumn proper begins at the end of 
this Eena. Complete preparation of 
tools and seeds and labour for 
agriculture; end of slack period of the 
"year"; best for growing groundnuts; 
not good for sowing sorghum. 
Duraa 
9th July to 22nd July 
Sorghum sown at this Eena gives best 
results; good for sowing groundnuts, 
tomatoes and onions. 
Natra 
22nd July to 4th August 
Spread of pests (grasshoppers, locusts, 
mice, etc.); no good for sowing of any 






4th August to 31st August 
Mist is a feature of this Eena; 
uncompleted sowing of sorghum may 
be resumed; good for sowing cotton 





17th August to 31st August 
Hot; likelihood of heavy rains. 






31st August to 13th September 
Its rains mark the end of autumn, is 
good for plants. Sow tomatoes and 
onions. Last chance for late sowing of 
cotton; cotton sown earlier if attended 
to will flourish in this Eena. Desperate 
late sowing of sorghum will be 





13th September to 26th September 
Good for growing tomatoes, 
cucumbers and onions. Temperature 
starts dropping making it possible to 






26th September to 9th October 
Temperature continues dropping and 
winter winds start; good for sowing 





9th October to 22nd October 
Real beginning of winter and its 
winds. Finish the sowing started in 
previous Eena. 
It is obvious that the above calendar evolves from a 
system primarily developed for rainfed agriculture. The 
calendar is also adapted to the present system of agricul- 
ture as evident from the instructions on sowing going far 
beyond the rainy season. The system does not only 
combine prediction on rain, temperature, pasture, pests 
and yields but it also gives clear advice on which activity to 
be pursued at any Eena. Our findings here however overlap 
with the official and semi official calendar specially with 
regards to sowing. For cotton, groundnuts and sorghum, 
our system recommends sowing to take place at later dates. 
With regard to wheat, our system seems to favour the 
sowing to start earlier and also finish earlier than the 
reported results. Needless to say that a change in sowing 
also implies a concommitant shift in prewatering dates. 
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Who Irrigates? 
For the tenants, irrigation is the most important 
agricultural activity which should not be left to hired 
workers to perform. Exception occurs in the case of using 
an agent (waked), renting the tenancy or resorting to 
sharecropping. The tenants also assume that the workers, 
some of whom are indeed transitory to the Scheme, do not 
have sufficient knowledge of modern irrigation. The 
comparatively low status of the workers is also assumed to 
make it difficult for them to deal efficiently with other 
tenants and indeed with the ghafirs (water bailiffs). 
Sharecropping and renting of tenancy however mean that 
many workers might also be involved in irrigation. 
According to our investigation which covered 126 tenants 
for three different categories of crops, sharecropping for (i) 
cotton and wheat, (ii) sorghum/groundnuts and (iii) 
vegetable was running at the rate of 4.8% , 66.70/0 and 25.4% 
respectively. Renting of tenancies for the same crops was 
0%, 0% and 66.7% respectively. It is important to note here 
that some of the sharecroppers and those cultivating by 
rent may also belong to the same tenants' ethnic groups 
(Tab 1). 
Tab 1 shows that a considerable number of those involved 
in watering might not be tenants. This necessitates a change in 
agricultural extension currently addressing tenants through TV, 
radio, films, etc. in matters pertaining to irrigation and other 
agricultural activities. It is to be noted that transistor radios are 
owned by 81% of tenants while TVs are owned by only 55% of 
the studied population. This finding outlines the limitation of 
TVs in disseminating such important knowledge. Compared to 
the tenants, the workers own even fewer transistor radios and 
certainly no TVs. If ever the message is to get through, 
addressing the workers in any extension work also requires a 
drastic shift from the current elitist language used in the media 
to simple Arabic or perhaps other languages spoken by workers. 
Methods of Irrigation 
According to the Gezira tenants, 
"Crop watering isthe most important activity for the growth 
of the plant. It is also the most demanding job and has to be 
performed with high levels of skill, dedication and ingenuity. 
Shrewdness, knowledge of the official regulations and how 
to manipulate and avoid them are also important qualities 
for the water user. In the past, (and the tenants are famous for 
glorifying the past of the Gezira Scheme) watering involved 
little confrontation with other tenants, bailiffs and other 
officials. That was mainly because the canals were well 
maintained, the bailiffs carried out their esponsibilities and 
the available system of communication e abled the tenants 
to communicate their equests ina satisfactory manner. Now 
things have changed. There is rarely enough water in the 
canals at pertinent times. We often have to steal it, bribe the 
bailiffs to get it or tamper with its level to irrigate our crops in 
time." 
Overlooking the exaggeration i the above quotation, 
one can still find some justification for the grudges aimed 
at the present state of irrigation in the Scheme. The 
Tab 1 Who cultivates 
expansion of the Scheme and its intensification have put 
an extra strain on its management and have obviously 
affected the level of water delivery as well. A part of the 
success of the Gezira Scheme was due to its ability to keep 
the cost of management down. The inspector to tenant 
ratio of 1:250 reported nearly 20 years ago has not changed 
much and the same high burden applies to many 
departments in the Scheme. Pertinent to the marginal 
improvement which could be obtained by increasing the 
official to tenant ratio in the Scheme is the conclusion that 
irrigated agriculture is the most expensive mode of 
agriculture in the Sudan. 
Like many other official segments in the country, the 
Gezira Scheme has not been able to develop an efficient 
tradition of maintenance. Lack of maintenance could be 
observed everpeehere in the Scheme; phone system, roads, 
buildings, canals, etc. Crop watering has undoubtedly been 
affected by this lack of maintenance. Without clinging to 
the myth that tenants were more disciplined in the past, if 
the cultivated crop is to survive, the present water delivery 
makes it inevitable to breach the text regulations. The 
following is a summary of the current watering practices 
recorded by ourselves. 
The ideal watering practice is to divide tenancies along 
Abu 'Ishriin-canal into two units. The head unit which 
consists of the first four tenancies will be watered within 
four days. The farmers of the second unit (five tail 
tenancies) delay their irrigation until the head tenancies 
have finished watering. Little or no tampering with the 
canals and the level of water in it takes place in this ideal 
system. Such a method of irrigation is only possible under 
the following conditions: 
1) When tenants are convinced that water is plentiful and 
will remain so for a few days to come. 
2) When crops are not too desperate forwater and will not 
be seriously affected in the event of a sudden breakage 
of water delivery. 
When these conditions prevail, farmers along the canal 
collaborate and undertake watering in the manner 
described above. Things, however, do not always remain 
equal and the resort o other - unorthodox - practices has 
to be pursued. When the water is available but falls slightly 
below the perceived convenient level, then there is still 
room for order and collaboration among Abu 'Ishriin 
tenants. Using mud, a small dam is constructed in Abu 
'Ishriin-canal just at the point separating the head and tail 
units. Occasionally the mud heap is replaced by sacks of 
mud. The use of sacks is however alaborious task requiring 
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the collaboration of a group of farmers. This practice is 
regarded as "more illegal" and is therefore done strictly 
behind the Scheme officials and sub-officials. The use of 
sacks is sometimes done behind the eyes of tail tenants 
who normally object unless they are sure that the sacks will 
be removed afterwards. 
If  a single dam in Abu 'Ishriin-canal is not enough for 
raising water to the convenient level, then a resort to a 
different practice is invoked. A single dam is made for 
every single tenancy starting from the head one. This is a 
much slower practice and it therefore involves conflicts 
among Abu 'Ishriin tenants mostly due to overworry about 
water and speed of irrigation. If  the tenants are not satisfied 
with the level of water, then the FOP (Field Outlet Pipe) 
joining the Minor canal with Abu 'Ishriin can be 
manipulated to ease the problem. Indeed the head and tail 
enders are in continuous dispute about he state of Minor-  
Abu 'Ishriin connection. It is now a common scene to see 
the slice of the FOP used in farmers' kitchens as a Kisra 
(pancake) griddle. While tenants at the head may be 
worried about overflooding in the event of an 
unmaintained canal, they often resort to keeping the FOP 
closed and therefore stop water from flowing into Abu 
'Ishriin-canal. Tail enders, on the other hand, steal the slice 
or throw it in the water to ensure a continuous flow into 
Abu 'Ishriin-canal. 
Tampering with the water control in the Minor canal is a 
more drastic measure followed by the tenants in their 
plight to ensure better irrigation. Depending on the 
position of the tenancies, both the head and cross 
regulators at the Minor canal can be lowered or raised at 
will by removing or replacing some of the bricks forming 
the weir. Desperate situations may also lead to breaking the 
canal itself if the FOP proved difficult to manipulate. A
similar case was reported in August 1987 when a group of 
tenants attacked the Minor late at night, broke it and 
irrigated their fields. Two of the tenants were subsequently 
arrested after being reported to the Inspector in charge and 
their only defense was that they could not wait and watch 
their crops drying out. The arrested tenants were 
eventually released after the inspector eported that their 
relatives were able to restore the canal to its former shape. 
According to our investigation, the Major canal itself is 
not immune against he hands of the tenants. The help of 
the bailiffis often secured by all means to do the job. If  that 
is not possible for whatever reason, then there is nothing to 
worry about. A special wrench, a rope and a bamboo stick 
are all that the tenants need to open the Major canal, keep 
the water flowing and render the services of the bailiff 
unnesessary. Should the bailiff still prove an obstacle, he - 
and it is always he - can be approached through his 
relatives, bribed or even threatened with violence. At most, 
he can only report the matter to the inspector and in that 
event, a good apology might settle the problem. Tampering 
with either the Minor or Major canals is a continuous cause 
of conflict among tenants along these two canals. While 
some tenants try to close them in order to raise the level of 
water, those further ahead do exactly the opposite to keep 
the flow in motion. The interference of the tenants in these 
canals and indeed the practices of many bailiffs make a 
mockery of the Night Storage System which prohibits 
irrigation during the night. The engineers themselves 
sometimes confiscate the canal gate openers to stop their 
bailiffs from yielding to the demand of the tenants and in 
so doing disrupt the official watering system. 
In talking about blatant breaking of the rules, a 
mention must be made to reverse irrigation referred to as 
nakoosi. This is simply the practice of irrigating a tenancy 
through an outlet of water made on the reverse direction of 
other Abu arba'a canal at Abu 'Ishriin-canal. A nakoosi 
could also be extended from Minor canals. Permission is 
likely to be obtained from the Block Inspector to use such a 
method of irrigation in at least the following cases: 
1) When the tenancy is too high to be irrigated from its 
respective canal. 
2) When the respective canal is not maintained to permit 
irrigation of the tenancy. 
3) When the newly established fruit gardens cannot be 
irrigated from the respective canals. 
Block Inspectors are always reluctant to give 
permission to allow the use of this method in order to 
discourage its institutionalisation and thus make it a 
common practice. The practice also invites complaints 
from other tenants whose flow is reduced by such a 
nakoosi. The tenants on the other hand are unlikely to ask 
for permission to use this method unless they are sure that 
their request will be met favourably by the Inspector. If 
they ever asked and fail to obtain the permission, then they 
cannot go ahead with it without expecting severe 
punishment. Once the tenants decide that it is necessary to 
use a nakoosi, they simply go ahead with it. In most cases 
they will be pardoned provided that they remove these 
canals without forcing the Inspector to use hired labour 
charging it to their accounts. 
Watering of Different Crops 
Cotton 
A number of variables have to be taken into account in 
talking about crop watering. These variables range from the 
type of crop under investigation, stage of the growth of the 
crop, level of humidity, expectation of future rainfall, 
intensity of heat and wind, degree of supervision from the 
part of the management, availablility and cost of labour, 
agricultural activity preceding or following watering, etc. 
These variables do not only affect the amount of water to 
be released, but also the method used to adjust its flow in 
the tenancy. 
The most demanding crop in watering is cotton which is 
also a subject of tight supervision from the management. 
There are also some indications that cotton is by far more 
sensitive to changes in watering than other crops cultivated 
in the Scheme. In general, cotton requires watering every 
12 to 15 days with a total number of around 18 waterings. 
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The following constitutes only the major waterings of this 
crop: 
Before sowing and/or ploughing. 
After sowing. 
After resowing (rugaa). 
After use of herbicides. 
After use of fertilizer. 
At the flowering stage. 
During harvesting (Acala type only). 
Immediately after cotton sowing, one has to water the 
tenancy. The amount of watering depends on whether 
there has been presowing watering or not. The extent of 
presowing watering also determines the amount of water to 
be released into the tenancy. Care should be taken not to 
overwater the tenancy and therefore lead to the rotting 
of the seeds. Too little water may lead to abortive 
germination of the seeds as well. Soon the tenancy has to 
be revisited for reseeding within five to ten days. 
The following watering may be delayed until after the 
clearing of weeds and it is mostly light. Clearing of weeds 
continues together with the process of thinning which 
takes place during this period. Rain is mostly expected at 
this time and that has to be considered in watering the 
cotton. Fertilizer is used soon and the farrows are re- 
established before the next watering. From now on, 
watering should continue with 12 to 15 day intervals until 
the harvest time. Subject to the availability of labour, 
watering should be done soon after the first cotton picking. 
If labour is not available, the watering should be delayed to 
avoid having the ripe cotton fall into the water. This, 
however, applies only to the long staple cotton (barakat/ 
shambat). In the case of the short staple cotton (acala), 
there is no danger of the cotton falling into the water and it 
is therefore possible to continue watering until labour is 
secured. 
Sorghum and Groundnuts 
The watering of sorghum and groundnuts is relaxed 
and carried out with little interference from the 
management of the Scheme. Although the majority of 
the tenants opt for the tagnant (dike or bund) as the 
standard method of irrigating these two crops, some 
still manage to find time for the labour intensive 
ditches (jadwals) especially when the crops are small. 
Unlike with cotton, the farmers here are at ease to use their 
imagination with regards to the number of ditches to 
be used. This is also necessitated by the fact that 
both goundnuts and sorghum are often grown on inferior 
soils. 
Sowing for both sorghum and groundnuts takes place 
before watering the land. Like cotton, resowing of these 
two crops is also followed by watering. In general, most 
tenants prefer watering to continue at the interval of 12 to 
16 days. Watering is also regarded as extremely necessary 
during the flowering stage of groundnuts and during the 
ripening of sorghum. 
Wheat 
The sowing of wheat seems ot be preceded by much 
work compared to other crops. There ist first ploughing 
(fathia) and second ploughing (hirata) in addition to the 
preparation of ditches and tagnats. As cotton will be 
competing for water against wheat, the tenancy must be 
well prepared so that should the need arise, water could be 
quickly diverted from the former crop to the latter. The 
preparation of ditches mentioned above should not 
indicate that they will be used one after another in 
watering. In fact, the whole tenancy is divided into three 
sections and the method of flooding each section at a time 
provides the main framework for watering the wheat 
tenancy. Given a high flow of water, tenants at the head 
may be able to water their tenancies within a single day or a 
little longer. Those at the middle or tail spend much longer 
time than that and it is not unusual for some to interrupt 
their watering for two days and wait for the level of water to 
rise. Compared to cotton, the watering of wheat received 
less scrutiny from the Scheme supervision and the farmers, 
therefore, have a better chance to choose the method they 
see fit for irrigation. 
The above paragraphs indicate that there are generally 
two methods of irrigation. A systematic and stage by stage 
irrigation following the ditches and farrows (angaya) and 
irrigation by flooding the whole tenancy, half or a third of it 
at a time. The first system corresponds to the text book 
system which is favoured by the Scheme and officially 
believed to conserve water. This is however less popular 
among tenants and is only followed up to a degree for the 
satisfaction of the management of the Scheme. This is 
mainly because the system of stage by stage irrigation is 
labour intensive. In terms of land preparation ie digging 
the farrows and ditches, it costs as much as 150% more than 
what is required for flood irrigation systems. In terms of 
irrigation, the stage by stage method also requires much 
more time than the other system. In abandoning it in 
favour of the flooding system, the tenants are said to have 
been able to reduce the time needed for irrigation in a 
brilliant fashion. It was reported in the 1970s that such 
method could reduce the time needed for irrigating a7.7 ha 
tenancy from 468 man/hour per crop to 17. 
The farmers, however, have a say here: the stage by 
stage method is not without its disadvantages. When the 
crop is small, flooding could be quite damaging. Moreover, 
if the tenancy is not evenly levelled, flood irrigation leads 
to the concentration of water on the lower part of the 
tenancy and to partial overflooding and inadequate 
irrigation of the higher parts of the tenancy. 
As it is already implied, a flood irrigation system is less 
demanding and less costly. It is also more appropriate 
when the crop is high above the ground and in which case 
the farmer must avoid excessive movement between 
plants. Re-establishing the ditches at this stage of the 
growth of the plant is also damaging for the plants. 
Needless to say, this system requires minimum supervision 
from the part of the water user. Should the watering 
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continue through the night, the farmers can simply reduce 
the flow of water by tampering with the Minor canal and 
leave the farm overnight without worrying about 
overflooding. As I mentioned before, the only problem is 
the fear of partial overflooding of the tenancy if the land is 
not well levelled. This however increases the time input in 
supervision rather than rendering the whole method 
inappropriate. Flood irrigation is also aided by the nature 
of the Gezira clay. The swelling of the clay ensures that 
water flows away from wet to dry parts of the tenancy. 
Gezira Scheme Bureaucracy 
The Gezira Scheme is run by a rigid bureaucratic 
system marked by its high centralisation of decision 
making. Once a decision is made, it is often adopted with 
little consideration to local variations. With such a huge 
Scheme, it is obvious that the easiest way to run it is 
through managerial adherence to rigid textbooks. The 
problem is that this rigid bureaucracy has outgrown its 
ability to sustain itself. Ironically speaking, this 
bureaucratic system is surviving not because of successful 
bureaucratic management but because of the ability of the 
farmers to get around it. The farmers are no longer passive 
recipients of instructions on new methods of cultivation. 
They have already mastered the rigour of the imposed 
system of informal channels to deal with its bureaucracy. 
The system of informal channels which ighlights the 
innovativeness of tenants is developed in order to help 
tenants breaking even and to cushion the rigidity and the 
inefficiency of the Scheme-bureaucracy. Let me use water 
requests as an example of bureaucratic sequences required 
in water delivery. In order to put forward a request for more 
water, the message moves from the tenants to the local 
bailiff then to the head bailiff (GB) then to the Block 
Inspector, then to the Irrigation Engineer who will instruct 
MOI (Ministry of Irrigation) bailiff to release the 
increment of water required. With the communication 
system under virtual collapse, one could imagine how long 
the process will take. If  it ever rained when the request for 
water was still on its way, the tenants were in real trouble. 
With little prospects of reversing the order in time, then a 
resort o the informal channels was indeed a necessity. The 
local bailiff is instrumental in carrying out the orders of the 
Scheme but so too is he in delivering the unofficial 
requests of the tenants. When the Scheme started, the 
bailiffs were mostly imported from outside the peasants' 
community. They were a part of the management 
machinery and they lived in houses provided by the 
Scheme and located in accessible places near the canals 
which they were paid to attend to. Nowadays most of the 
bailiffs are local and they have deserted their official 
houses in favour of the tenants' villages where they belong. 
Their position has indeed become precarious as they are 
caught up between their obligations to their kin tenants 
and their duties to the managerial c ass to which they often 
aspire to belong. In order to keep his job, the bailiff has to 
convince his superior that he is satisfactorily executing the 
orders. At the same time, the bailiff acknowledges his 
obligations to the tenants, not to mention his awareness 
that he cannot survive on his meagre salary. As I implied 
before, the bailiff can be approached by the tenants 
invoking kinship and/or neighbourhood obligations, can 
be threatened with violence, beaten up or bribed. This is 
done to officiate an illegal act or at least to turn a blind eye 
when the tenants go against the rules. The bribery of the 
bailiffs is so institutionalised in the tenants' community 
that during the wheat and sorghum harvest time, the bailiff 
moves with his empty sacks from one farm to the other to 
collect his informal tributes. 
In order to maximise their gains or simply to break 
even, tenants have also extended their informal dealings in 
order to raise their shares in the crops produced. It is 
normal for tenants to pick up some cotton and sell it to the 
local merchants; an illegal pratice as all cotton should be 
handed over to the Scheme. Through bribing those who are 
in charge of threshing wheat and recording the amount 
harvested, tenants can also declare a lower output and 
therefore increase their share in the produce. 
In enlisting the above dealings, we are neither 
interested in exposing the tenants to the management of
the Scheme nor in covering all their illicit practices. Indeed, 
we feel that the Scheme is fully aware of most of these 
dealings but is deliberately opting to keep its so-called 
"official coolness". Those who are interested in capturing 
other means of rule twisting employed by the tenants may 
turn to diversion of fertilizers and other chemicals to the 
market or to other crops, renting and sale of tenancies, 
sharecropping, off-tenancy activities, animal breeding, 
absenteeism, etc. For our part, we would like to state here 
that these informal channels have been adopted to face the 
rigidity of the Scheme, its inefficiency and lack of realism. 
Such channels also indicate the innovativeness of tenants 
and how they have been able to survive. Those who are 
sympathetic to the tenants are not without a reason to 
rejoice. By developing these "off-the-text-book-channels", 
the tenants deserve the credit for helping the system to 
keep going. 
Tenants' Views on NSS 
The present water delivery system in the Gezira is 
indeed chaotic and difficult to describe. It cannot be 
described as a "night storage system" (NSS) because 
irrigation takes place at night as well. It is hardly a system 
of continuous flow because the water does not flow 
continuously and both the design of the canals and the 
managerial practices indicate otherwise. In a questionnaire 
which covered 60 farmers distributed along Hamza Minor 
Canal, 95% of the informants expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the present system. The tenants eem 
to have been tired of tampering with the canals and with 
the performance of their own Production Committees. 
Accepting their subordinate position in the management of 
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the Scheme, 85% of our interviewed tenants favoured a 
system of irrigation where the water discharge will be 
strictly controlled by the Inspector and his staff. This 
gesture, however, is not without its conditions: canals must 
be maintained, bailiffs must do their job properly and the 
water must be delivered in time. Given the current 
constraints of the Gezira Scheme, we are aware that these 
conditions are not easy to meet. An important message to 
be learned from the tenants here is that their interference 
in water delivery is necessitated by the inefficiency of the 
system and that an improvement in the official 
management ofwater is likely to induce a decrease in their 
meddling with water discharge. 
Conclusion 
The paper shows the tenants are not passive recipients 
of orders from the management of the Scheme; they have 
their theories and they have developed their techniques of 
turning the system to suit heir needs. Whether the tenants 
resort to the informal channels constituting corruption, 
lack of discipline or innovation is beside the point. Our 
reference to the informal channels as indicative of tenants' 
innovation should not in any way imply that we condone 
bribery or destructions of canals. Pertinent questions here 
are why the tenants go informal and how to reduce the gap 
between the official and the unofficial practices. The 
following few lines may help towards the elimination of at 
least some of the problems under investigation. 
The informal channels are, primarily, developed to cope 
with the lack of adequate responses to tenants' water 
problems. Without conjecturing on the ability of the 
Scheme to make water available for all the current 
cultivated crops, lack of appropriate response cannot be 
avoided without adequate maintenance of the canals and 
improving the system of communication which affects 
water delivery. If that can be done, and we see no reason 
why it should not, repetitive successful responses from the 
Scheme will also help restore the confidence of tenants in 
the official management of water and hence eliminate 
many unnecessary practices of the farmers. Although the 
tenants are not experts in the management ofwater above 
the farm level, they still point to the frequent lack of 
coordination between the Scheme (Ministry of 
Agriculture) and the Ministry of Irrigation and its alleged 
negative impact on water delivery. Many of them suggest 
that the Scheme should be fully in charge of all the canals. 
However, the managers of the Scheme may wish to look at 
this suggestion, the fact remains that the present system 
complicates the management of water and places some of 
the canals in the hands of those whose primary concern is 
not the welfare of the cultivated crop. 
Pertinent o our problems here is also the question of 
divergent priorities of the Scheme management and their 
tenants. For the tenants, priority goes to the conservation 
of labour and time invested in irrigation in addition to 
precedence of sorghum over cotton. In sharp contrast o 
that is the Scheme's emphasis on water conservation a d 
preference of cotton over sorghum. Such differences must 
be resolved in order to reduce conflicts in water practices. 
As sorghum requires little watering compared to cotton, 
plans must be made to ensure meeting its water 
requirement and indeed we see no reason for not giving 
priority to food production in the Scheme and indeed in a 
famine stricken country. The share of the tenants in cotton 
production could also be made more attractive. Prompt 
payment of tenants' share in cotton could encourage many 
farmers not only to put more efforts in cotton but equally 
to be able to make more accurate correlation between their 
efforts and their gains. Under the present enants' work 
load and their current share in the proceeds of crops, 
there is no way out of flood irrigation. As we have no 
adequate knowledge of how wasteful this method is when 
compared with the ditch method, we cannot recommend 
its officiation. Future research may help to resolve this 
issue. 
We have already touched on many issues regarding 
closing the gap between the tenants and the management 
in the field of water use and delivery. The gap cannot be 
closed without getting the management and the tenants to 
adopt the same views and practices. In a setting in which 
the management and the tenants constitute two separate 
classes, this is indeed a problem which is difficult to solve. 
Familiarity with tenants' theories and practices requires 
contacts which must go beyond honouring tenants' 
wedding and circumcision ceremonies by top officials. As 
long as the Inspectors and other top officials avoid getting 
their feet muddy and as long as getting inside the schisto 
infested water of the canal is a taboo, the problem will not 
go away and the gap will remain wide. We realise that a 
partial solution of the problem can be effected by 
encouraging the top officials to go dirty and by selecting a
cadre which does not shy away from getting muddy feet but 
above all by decontaminating all the canal water. This will, 
however, only reduce the gap whose full elimination 
requires fundamental changes in the Scheme and which 
cannot be adequately dealt with in this paper. 
* This paper is based on a research conducted in 1987/1989. 
Full details on bibliographic sources can be found in: Farm 
Level Study of  Water Management in the Gezira Scheme. 
Hydraulic Research Station, Medani 1989. 
